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UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT WITH NAZI WAR CRIMES
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN *
I very much appreciate the opportunity to be a panelist with such
distinguished people and to address such an extraordinarily important
subject. I think I can contribute most to this discussion by recounting a
little bit of the history of the United States' involvement with Nazi war
crimes.
Until the mid 1970s, with one or two small exceptions,' the United
States government was not particularly interested in the presence of Nazi
war criminals in this country.' Indeed, at the very time that it was
prosecuting the Nuremberg cases, the United States was sheltering such
Nazi war criminals as Klaus Barbie from accountability for war crimes
committed in France. In addition, a United States government report
found that government officials committed crimes in their effort to protect
Klaus Barbie.4
In another case, this one having its situs in Belgium, the United States
government again violated either its own laws or foreign laws in
protecting Nazi war criminals from local accountability. 5  The whole
story, however, has never been disclosed to the American people: the
story of the numbers involved, who was involved and what actions were
taken. It nevertheless is known that the United States government brought
Nazi war criminals to this country.' In some cases, this was accom-
* Comptroller, City of New York; A.B., 1962, Radcliffe College; J.D., 1965,
Harvard Law School.
1. There is one rather well-known exception: the case of Hermine Braunsteiner Ryan,
who was a concentration camp guard at Maidonick. She was identified on the street, I
believe, in Queens, New York. She was a Queens resident. She was extradited from the
United States and stood trial in Europe. Aside from this prosecution, nothing was done by
the United States government. See Barbie Called One of Many Ex-Nazis Aided by U.S.,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1983, § 1, at 4, col. 1. See generally Ex-U.S. Agents Tell of Efforts
to Help Barbie, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1983, at A3, col. 1.
2. See generally Lippman, The Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals in the United
States: Is Justice Being Served?, 7 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 169, 171 (1985).
3. See A. RYAN, QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN AMERICA
281 (1984); Goldberg, Klaus Barbie and the United States Government, 19 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1 (1984); Kamen, U.S. Routinely Hired Nazi War Criminals, Report Says,
Wash. Post, June 17, 1988, at A23, col. 1.
4. See Alleged Nazi War Criminals, 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 70-71 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 House Hearings] (statement of Anthony DeVito,
Former Immigration and Naturalization Service Investigator); see also Doman, Aftermath
of Nuremberg: The Trial of Klaus Barbie, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 449, 450-51 (1989); U.S.
Still Using Nazis as Spies: Ex-Justice Aide, Chi. Tribune, June 29, 1985, at 3, col. 4;
O'Toole, Apologies to France: U.S. Admits Sheltering Barbie, Wash. Post, Aug. 17, 1983,
at Al, col. 1.
5. See Blumenthal, U.S. Faulted in Hiring of Belgian Nazi War Criminal, N.Y. Times,
June 17, 1988, at A9, col. 1; see also Lippman, supra note 2, at 175.
6. See A. RYAN, supra note 3, at 282; Lippman, supra note 2, at 176-77, 197; Note,
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
plished apparently in defiance of presidential directives;7 in other cases,
it was done through various means of deceit.' The General Accounting
Office has documented these activities in its various reports on the
subject.9
There were some estimates that as many as ten thousand Nazi war
criminals came to this country on their own without direct government
support. 10 To this number must be added the untold number of war
criminals that the United States government brought to the United States.
Finishing the Work of Nuremberg? Nazi War Criminals and American Law, 20 CONN. L.
REv. 633, 639 (1988); Blumenthal, Axis Supporters Enlisted by U.S. in Postwar Role,
N.Y. Times, June 20, 1982, at A22, col. 1; see also Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S.
490 (1981); Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Linnas, 527
F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D.
Ohio 1981); United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (cases showing
that "brought" also includes indirectly making it easier for Nazi war criminals to enter and
stay in the United States through lengthy deportation proceedings and lax enforcement of
immigration investigations, i.e., the Displaced Persons Act).
7. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 2; Note, U.S. Exclusion and Deportation of Nazi War
Criminals: The Act of October 30, 1978, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 101, 116 (1980);
Hershey, U.S. Recruited Nazis For Intelligence Work, Investigators Say, N.Y. Times, May
17, 1982, at B 11, col. 1.
8. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 3; Blumenthal, Possible Cover-up on Nazis Is Focus
of New U.S. Inquiry, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1982, at AI, col. 1; see also Fedorenko, 449
U.S. 490; Maikovskis, 773 F.2d 435; Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426; Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp.
1362; Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51 (Nazi war criminals deceiving the United States by lying
about their previous work experiences); 1979 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 64-71
(United States government officials deceiving the United States by relying on the Nazi war
criminals to tell the truth about their previous work experiences instead of conducting a full
investigation into their backgrounds).
9. See U.S. COMP. GEN. REP., WIDESPREAD CONSPIRACY TO OBSTRUCT PROBES OF
ALLEGED NAzI WAR CRIMINALS NOT SUPPORTED BY AVAILABLE EVIDENCE-CONTRO-
VERSY MAY CONTINUE, 32-39, 179 (May 15, 1978) [hereinafter U.S. COMP. GEN. REP.];
see also Moeller, U.S. Treatment of Alleged Nazi War Criminals: International Law,
Immigration Law, and the Need for International Cooperation, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 793, 817
(1985).
10. See Comment, Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals, 40 MD. L. REV. 39, 41-42
(1981); Note, Nazi Persecutors in the U.S.: Proposed Consolidation of the Denaturalization
and Deportation Proceedings, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L., REV. 361, 362 (1985); Note,
supra note 6, at 636 (calling estimate of 10,000 a "speculation in very light clothing");
Blumenthal, Giving Nazis a Break, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1984, § 7, at 31, col. 1; see also
Belated Push to Deport Former Nazis, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 30, 1980, at 33
[hereinafter Belated Push]. But see Ukrainian Reply to Nazi Hunter, Chi. Tribune, Mar.
23, 1985, at 10, col. 3 (claiming that the actual number of Nazi war criminals who came
to the United States is unknown).
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One such war criminal is Arthur Rudolph, who is residing in West
Germany."' The West Germans, however, have refused to proceed against
him.' 2 Rudolph left this country to evade being tried for war crimes.'3
He was one of the top administrators in a slave labor camp where 28,000
people were worked to death.14 Despite his affiliations, Rudolph was
brought here in apparent violation of presidential directives, which
precluded Nazi war criminals from being brought to this country.1 5 It
should be emphasized that Rudolph was not a scientist, but merely a camp
administrator.' 6 Nevertheless, he became an important figure in the
NASA space program, which awarded him various medals.' 7 Even
though the United States government knew the allegations against him,
Rudolph managed to flee this country and avoid trial." It remains a
mystery how many other Arthur Rudolphs were brought to this country.
As I said, it is estimated that ten thousand people, maybe more,
maybe less, came here without the benefit of government assistance on
their arrival. These are people who engaged in a whole variety of war
crimes. We know now of some of those cases, but the whole story still
has never been written: who these people are, what their crimes were, to
what extent the government knew of their presence here and so forth.
I was a newly elected member of Congress and a member of the
11. See Blumenthal, supra note 10, at 31, col. 1; Arthur Rudolph's Dark Past, L.A.
Daily J., Oct. 24, 1984, at 4, col. 1; Blumenthal, German-Born NASA Expert Quits U.S.
to Avoid a War Crimes Suit, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1984, at Al, col. 1 (claiming that
Rudolph went back to West Germany to avoid being prosecuted for war crimes in the
United States).
12. See Arthur Rudolph's Dark Past, supra note 11, at 4, col. 1. It should be noted that
the statute of limitations has run, thus preventing the West German government from
prosecuting Rudolph. Blumenthal, supra note 11, at Al, col. 2.
13. See Blumenthal, supra note 11, at Al, col. 1.
14. But see Arthur Rudolph's Dark Past, supra note 11, at 4, col. 1 (claiming that
20,000 workers died, not 28,000).
15. See Top Secret Memorandum from the President Harry S. Truman to Robert P.
Patterson, Secretary of War (Aug. 30, 1946). See generally O'Toole, U.S. Used Many Ex-
Nazis Sought for War Crimes, Wash. Post, Mar. 28, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
16. See Blumenthal, supra note 11, at Al, col. 1 (describing Rudolph as a production
manager at a rocket plant at Dora-Nordhausen camp). But see Thornton, Alleged Nazi-Era
War Criminal To Be Deported to Soviet Union, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1984, A18, col. 1
(describing Rudolph as a scientist and an engineer).
17. Rudolph was awarded the Exceptional Service Medal in 1968 and the Distinguished
Service Medal in 1969, the agency's highest honor. See NASA Refuses to Comment on Its
Former Official, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1984, at A13, col. 1.
18. See Blumenthal, supra note 11, at Al, col. 1.
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Immigration Subcommittee in 1974 when I was informed that there were
Nazi war criminals living in the United States. I also learned that the
United States government, particularly the immigration service, had a list
of these people and was doing nothing about it. My reaction was one of
disbelief; it made no sense to me that Nazi war criminals would be here,
and it made even less sense to me that the United States government
would know something about it and do nothing. Consequently, in the
spring of 1974, I asked at a public hearing of the Commission of
Immigration whether it was true that the immigration service had a list of
alleged Nazi war criminals living in this country. The answer was "yes."
I then asked what the government was doing about this list, and there was
no answer. I proceeded to look at many of the files and saw quite clearly
that there was no serious, systematic investigation whatsoever being
conducted on the matter. While the allegations were very serious against
these people, the standard United States government response was to send
an immigration official to question the subject of the allegations and to ask
that person about his or her health. 19
In 1974, I made public the facts that the United States government had
a list of alleged Nazi war criminals, that there was no systematic
investigation being conducted on the matter, that there was no systematic
effort to obtain documents or witnesses overseas and that there was no
professional or trained staff assigned to the case. I think that one of the
testaments of a democratic society is that ultimately a government
responds to the concerns of the public; to its credit, as time went by, the
government began to take some steps towards solving the problem of Nazi
war criminals in the United States.
In 1977, there was a special unit set up in the Department of Justice
to investigate these cases, and a number of cases were commenced., °
Unfortunately, this effort turned out to be rather unsatisfactory. The
Immigration Service is riddled with bureaucracy and a lack of high
morale. Therefore, in 1979, not through any legislation, but through an
offer that could not be refused, the administration acceded to my
insistence that a special unit be created in the criminal division of the
19. 1 was not aware until that moment that the immigration service considers itself to
be a public health agency, but I think that was the view it took of its job. Maybe it was
also waiting for these people to die. It is very hard to understand what the motivation was,
but that was the extent of the investigation. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 3.
20. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518
F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981); see Reiss, The Extradition of John Demjanjuk: War
Crimes, Universality Jurisdiction, and the Political Offense Doctrine, 20 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 281, 286 (1987).
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Department of Justice, a division that was one of well-recognized
professionalism and expertise. Thus, the Office of Special Investigation
(the OSI) was created in 1977 and has functioned since that time.2'
In addition, the government began to express its clear support of the
prosecution of these cases. Specifically, the attorney general of the United
States, Benjamin Civiletti, argued the first case to reach the Supreme
Court under the renewed effort that took place during the mid or late
1970s.' That case dealt with the deportation of a concentration camp
guard in Treblinka.
The OSI has functioned on the whole in a very professional, if not
extraordinary, fashion. One must imagine what it is like to bring cases
not ten years, not twenty years, but thirty years after the fact. Further-
more, there were supposed to be no witnesses left to tell the story. In
addition, documents were scattered all over the world; survivors were all
over the world. It took an extended effort to uncover information, to
assess the information and to bring the cases. Not only was the OSI, but
for the first time since the Nuremberg Trials, the United States govern-
ment formally asked countries in Eastern Europe, as well as the Soviet
Union, to cooperate in providing information about these cases.' As a
consequence, United States government officials were permitted to
examine materials in the archives in Poland, the Soviet Union and other
countries of Eastern Europe. OSI has won significant praise for its
professionalism worldwide and has operated successfully. If we look at
the statistics, as of today twenty-seven Nazi war criminals have been
expelled from the United States; there are twenty cases pending in United
States courts, and 511 cases are under investigation in the United States.
One may ask for a moment why trials were not conducted in the
United States. Under the original legislation covering some of these
21. See Mueller, Four Decades After Nuremberg: The Prospect of an International
Criminal Code, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 499, 501 (1987); Note, supra note 10, at 361; Note,
supra note 6, at 634-35, 641; Civiletti, War Criminals in the United States, L.A. Daily J.,
Feb. 22, 1980, at 28, col. 1; see also Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Osidach, 513
F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1981). See generally U.S. COMP. GEN. REP., supra note 9, at 165;
Belated Push, supra note 10, at 33.
22. See Comment, supra note 10, at 42-43; see also Thornton, supra note 16, at A18,
col. I (noting that this was Civiletti's one and only appearance in front of the Supreme
Court as attorney general); Reiss, supra note 20, at 286, 286 n.20; Fedorenko, 449 U.S.
490.
23. See Moeller, supra note 9, at 845; Note, supra note 6, at 651; see also U.S. COMP.
GEN. REP., supra note 9, at 167; Swisher, Soviets Sign Holocaust Agreement; Pact Gives
U.S. Council Access to Nazi Records, Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 1988, at Cl, col. 6.
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cases, the Displaced Persons Act, the Refugee Relief Act and under the
so-called Holtzman Amendment, which called for the deportation and
exclusion of Nazi war criminals from this country, there were no
provisions for trials in the United States. The reason for this was and
remains evident today: in this country, we have a serious problem with
prosecutions under those laws because of the ex post facto provisions in
the United States Constitution.' Any legislation holding people criminal-
ly accountable in this country for crimes committed abroad that were not
in violation of the then-applicable laws would be unlikely to get through
Congress or to be upheld by the courts. Furthermore, questions would be
raised as to the propriety of trying people in the United States for crimes
that were committed abroad, as opposed to having the people prosecuted
in the countries in which they committed the crimes. There may be any
number of other reasons that could justify not prosecuting them here.
Nevertheless, the constitutional qualms were the central ones and still
suffice even to this day.
Problems also exist in arranging for the prosecution of war criminals
abroad. First of all, with regard to the issues of deportation and
denaturalization, the proceedings here are what you would call
labyrinthine and byzantine: they are way too long and way too
cumbersome. The deportation of a United States citizen requires two
time-consuming steps, which include several sub-steps. The first stage is
the denaturalization process, which involves first a trial or a proceeding
in a federal district court then an appeal to a United States court of appeals
and then an appeal to the United States Supreme Court.' The second
stage is the deportation process,' which includes proceedings in
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (providing in pertinent part, "no Bill of Attainder or
ex poat facto Law shall be passed"); see also Lubet & Reed, Extradition of Nazis from the
United States to Israel: A Survey of Issues in Transnational Criminal Law, 22 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 1, 48 (1986); Moeller, supra note 9, at 834; Winicki, The Denaturalization and
Deportation of Nazi Criminals: Is it Constitutional?, 11 LOY. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 117
(1989); Comment, Holtzman Amendment-The Legacy of Nuremberg: Disguised Extradition
and Karl Linnas: Linnas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 790 F. 2d 1024 (2d Cir.
1986), 11 SUFFoLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 277, 281 (1987); Note, Denaturalization and
Deportation of Nazi War Criminals in the United States: Upholding Constitutional
Principles in a Single Proceeding, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 201 (1989); Note,
supra note 7, at 127. See generally C. GORDON & H. ROSENMELD, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE, vol. IA, § 4.3c (1988).
25. See Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 340(a), 66 Stat. 260
(1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1988)) [hereinafter Naturalization Act]; see
also Note, supra note 10, at 364; Note, Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals After
Fedorenko, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 169, 170-71 (1982); Note, supra note 7, at 129;
Belated Push, supra note 10, at 33. See generally Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 490.
26. See Naturalization Act, supra note 25; see also Abramson, Reflections on the
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Immigration Court, Board of Immigration Appeals, federal court of
appeals and United States Supreme Court. 27 The entire process contains
seven separate legal proceedings.28 I have urged for more than a decade
that these proceedings be combined and that deportation be ordered as part
of the legal remedy in the denaturalization case, when the evidence
warrants it. Congress, however, has refused or failed to act on my
urgings even though it would speed up the process enormously.
The following cases serve to illustrate the length of this process. The
case of John Demjanjuk, who was ultimately extradited to Israel, lasted
well over eight years.' The same is true of Manuekal Bowlas
Maikovskis' case, which, though originally brought in 1976, had not yet
finished when he fled the country in 1987 or 1988.1o Thus, it appears
that what should be developed are ways in which the proceedings in these
cases can be expedited consistent with due process. This can be done
easily in the deportation-denaturalization situation because both
proceedings can be combined into one proceeding, with the deportations
as a remedy the government can request once the commission of the war
crimes has been found. Moreover, when the person is not a United States
citizen, the government must be able to hasten the completion of these
cases.
Time is clearly on the side of the war criminals. Many of the victims
are now quite old or deceased, and their memories are fading. In
addition, documents remain increasingly difficult to find. Therefore, it is
crucial to speed up this process.31
Another problem deserving mention deals with evidence that recently
Unthinkable: Standards Relating to the Denaturalization & Deportation of Nazis & Those
Who Collaborated with the Nazis During World War II, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1311 (1989).
27. See Naturalization Act, supra note 25; see also Note, supra note 10, at 364 ("A
deportation action entails an initial administrative hearing before an immigration judge, an
administrative appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and then a subsequent
right to judicial review by a circuit court of appeals and by the U.S. Supreme Court, upon
a grant of certiorari.").
28. See Naturalization Act, supra note 25; see also Note, supra note 10, at 365.
29. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981); Reiss, supra
note 20, at 281; Note, Extradition-Nazis-Under Principal of Universal Jurisdiction, 10
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'LL.J. 607,610 (1986); Note, Extradition- Universal Jurisdiction- "War
Crimes, " 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 656, 657 (1986).
30. Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985).
31. See Morowitz, Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in the United States: The 7Te in
Which to Punish Them Is Running Out, 15 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 257 (1989). But
see Gelfand, Nazi War Criminals in the United States: It's Never Too Late for Justice, 19
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 855 (1986).
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has arisen. Apparently, the West German government is now asking for
all the documents in the Berlin Document Center to be turned over to
West Germany.32 The United States government has had jurisdiction
over these documents since the war.33 These documents, seized from the
Nazis, have been crucial to the investigation of Nazi war crimes and the
prosecution of cases, not only in the United States but in Canada,
Australia, Great Britain, West Germany, Israel and elsewhere.'
I am very concerned about the surrender of these documents to West
Germany. They do not belong to any particular country. They belong to
history. They belong to the world. After the occupation of Austria by the
allies ended in the 1950s, we turned over to the Austrian government the
equivalent of the Berlin Document Center documents. During the
Waldheim case, documents central to that case were found missing from
those files.
Once those files are out of our hands, there is no longer any way of
assuring their integrity. The integrity of those files is crucial, not just for
prosecutions now, but, for the preservation of the facts in the face of the
naysayers and revisionists and deniers of the Holocaust, who unfortunately
exist in so many countries today. There has been an effort recently to
prevent the United States government from turning these documents over
to West Germany as part of the unification effort. I certainly hope that
this effort succeeds.
I will make two final points. One is that, in addition to trying to
speed up the process of trying war criminals, I think it is imperative for
us to try to find out how it was that the United States government
collaborated with war criminals abroad, brought them to this country and
allowed thousands of them to stay here. That story has never been told.
For many years, I advocated the creation of a commission with full
subpoena powers to search the files of the CIA, OSI, FBI, army
intelligence and other military personnel, in order to find out the whole
story. My motivation was the belief that what took place here was a
policy of great immorality; a policy that was never approved by the people
of this country; a policy that was never approved by the Congress; and a
policy that was contrary, and in some cases directly contrary, to the laws
of this country.
32. See Bonn Pressing for Return of Nazi Files, L.A. Times, Mar. 15, 1990, at A19,
col. 1.
33. See Schmemann, Germans Open Trial on Theftis from Nazi Archive, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 6, 1988, at A17, col. 1.
34. See, e.g., D. MATAS & S. CHARENDOFF, JUSTCEDELAYED: NAZI WAR CRIMINALS
IN CANADA (1987).
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In the support and protection of Klaus Barbie and in the bringing of
Arthur Rudolph to this country, involved government officials reveal a
belief that the ends justify the means, including means that are illegal and
immoral. The story of this nation's collaboration with Nazi war criminals
is actually the story of an assault on our basic democratic structure. It is
a story that needs to be told. If we do not tell it soon, few people will be
around to complete that history and thereby assist us in making sure that
it never happens again.
Since the statute of limitations has long run on many possible
prosecutions, perhaps the best protection against war crime recurrence is
the exposure of people who engaged in conduct like this. To this day, it
is unknown how many, or which, government officials were involved.
This is not only a story that raises some very serious and sobering
questions; it is also a story demonstrating that, with diligence and
perseverance, standards of justice can be upheld. It is important to uphold
them. This is not just a matter of history. This is not just a matter of
resurrecting the past. This is not just a matter of revenge. If the world
cannot do justice in the case of the most heinous crimes committed in the
history of humankind, then what is the message to others who would
engage in such conduct? The message is-simply hide or escape-because
the world will simply yawn in the end; nobody cares. If we are
committed to international human rights, that is, human rights in any
country, then I believe we have to be committed to upholding a standard
of justice.
Most countries in the world do not accept a statute of limitations when
it comes to murder. Therefore, the denial of accountability, not for the
murder of one person, but, for the murder of six million Jews and
millions of non-Jews, in the most bestial, inhumane, abhorrent and
repugnant fashion, would leave justice totally devoid of meaning.
Thank you very much.
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